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Critical Cultural Legal Studies
Rosemary J. Coombe*
[My] purpose ... is to make explicit the systems of operational
combination ... which also compose a "culture," and to bring to
light the models of action characteristic of users whose status as the
dominated element in society ... is concealed by the euphemistic
term "consumers." Everyday life invents itself by poaching in
countless ways on the property of others.
-Michel De Certeau 1
Clint Eastwood doesn't want the tabloids to write about him.
Rudolf Valentino's heirs want to control his film biography. The
Girl Scouts don't want their image soiled by association with certain
activities. George Lucas wants to keep Strategic Defense Initiative
fans from calling it "Star Wars." Pepsico doesn't want singers to use
the word "Pepsi" in their songs. Guy Lombardo wants an exclusive
property right to ads that show big bands playing on New Year's
Eve. Uri Geller thinks he should be paid for ads showing psychics
bending metal through telekinesis. Paul Prudhomme, that
household name, thinks the same about ads featuring corpulent
bearded chefs. And scads of copyright holders see purple when
their creations are made fun of. Something very dangerous is going
on here.
-Judge Alex Kozinski2
The law seeks to eliminate ambiguity.
-Edmund Leach3
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toronto. The text of this article is drawn from
Rosemary J. Coombe, Contingent Articulations: A Critical Cultural Studies of Law, in LAW IN
THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 21 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998), and from the
introduction to ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (forthcoming Duke Univ. Press 1998). All rights
reserved. I thank the publishers for permitting me to reprint segments of both essays here and
Mark Fenster for the invitation to present my work in the context of this Symposium.
1. MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE at xi-xii (Steven Rendall
trans., 1984).
2. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1993).
3. EDMUND LEACH, CUSTOM, LAW, AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE 19 (1977).
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I. WALKING IN THE CITY
I am on my way to the university to teach my class in intellectual
property. I decide to walk down Queen Street-into that ever-so-self-
consciously hip strip officially (and painfully) known as "The Fashion
District," which runs west from the downtown core in Toronto.
Parallel to King and Dundas Streets and crosscut by Dufferin,
Bathurst, and Simcoe, Queen Street is central to the city's British
colonial topography, overlaid more recently by a municipally imposed
multiculturalism. Just to my west, street signs proclaim me to be in
"Little Portugal," although all visible evidence suggests that "Little
Saigon" might be more appropriate. Identities in such social contexts
shift too quickly to be encompassed by official mappings, which,
despite the liberal intentions of their cartographers, belie a colonial
containment of alterity.
Shifts in relations between spaces, places, and identities are clear in
the new uses of old contributions to the cityscape tendered by a now-
elderly generation of Ukrainian, Polish, and Czech im-
migrants-Orthodox churches, butcher shops, travel agencies, and
package services that long specialized in shipping goods into the
Soviet Union. Gradually, these commercial spaces are being
transformed. Rents along this section of the street are lower than they
are closer to downtown, but even this far west, aspiring entrepreneurs
accrue some of the street's cachet. Xeroxed reproductions of Warhol
posters, plastic busts of Elvis, Partridge Family gameboards, and
Monkees album covers are favored forms of commercial decor in an
area where Fredric Jameson's name is often dropped in caf6
conversations, and paraphrases of Jean Baudrillard litter the alter-
native press. Nostalgia with respect to histories of marketing and
celebrity, and an ironic attitude toward them, create a shared identity
for a generation unbound by organic traditions. This, social theorists
would have us believe, is characteristic of the condition of postmoder-
nity.
To obtain my morning espresso, I am once again compelled to
choose between great pastry at the local Ukrainian bakery or better
coffee at the Second Cup®, a franchised yuppie coffee bar that locals
tried hard to resent when it first "invaded" their neighborhood.
Priding themselves on their individuality and social distinction,
residents rejected the corporate insignia of serial equivalence that they
saw a "chain" to represent. Once the Ukrainian bakery obtained a
trademark, standardized its logo, and opened three new locations
flying the flag of FuturesTM, it seemed rather futile to maintain the
attitude. It's too early for decisions; characteristically, I decide simply
2
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not to decide and visit both. Clutching poppyseed cake and skimming
movie reviews, I bump into a disheveled young man. His shoulder bag
proclaims him "Armed and Hammered." I smile at the parody and
think about the different ways in which we recode and recycle the
detritus of commercial culture.
Standing in line amidst the predictable layout of the coffee bar (it's
probably a legally protected form of trade dress), I notice the lovely
graphics of the early-twentieth-century cigarette advertisements-now
enlarged and framed to hang on restaurant walls. Their availability for
this purpose is a consequence of the expiration of copyright protection
for the advertisements, but savvy marketers know only too well that
you need only provide them with a new format to set the royalties
flowing once again. Although the original image may not be protected
as an exclusive property, the new presentation of it will be. In any
case, the copyright notice will scare off a good number of competitors
regardless of its legitimacy or the extent of its coverage.4 I glance at
the display of merchandise in the coffee shop. "Old," "colonial"
trademarks have been newly reproduced to stick on bags of coffee
and adorn overpriced mugs while "new" varieties of expensive
Columbian beans are marketed with narratives of imperialist
nostalgia. Scorning the brandnamed coffees embraced by our parents,
we are nonetheless eager to embrace ever-emergent symbolic
distinctions in "unbranded" goods. The social passages, from adver-
tisement to ambience, distinction to genericity, labor to logo to
libertinism (the Armed and Hammered parody), and standardization
to signification that are congealed in these encounters are complex
but typical of relationships of symbolic exchange (as well as capitalist
patterns of manufacturing difference and consumer behaviors of social
differentiation).
In the window of a Latin American import shop I recognize a
familiar logo, but I can decipher no more-the rest of the label is in
Spanish. Jars of Nescafd® are imported from Latin America to sell to
immigrant families from Equador and Columbia, nostalgic for the
tastes of home. In mass markets, I muse, "the real thing" must be
authenticated by figures of standardization; somehow the trademark
embodies the security and comfort afforded by familiar distinctions.
This speculation is only slightly complicated when I find Jacob's
"Krim Krakers" from Malaysia in an Asian grocery-next to the more
familiar Jacob's Cream Crackers offered at a lower price. The cost of
importing the pidgin packaging is clearly substantial. Also on display
4. Witness, for instance, the number of old fruit crate labels and Southern racist product
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are varieties of tinned beans-canned by Mr Gouda's®. Once the
main source of mass-marketed Caribbean foodstuffs in Toronto-the
only source of ackee, for example-the company now markets
garbanzo, pinto, and kidney beans under the banner "Multicultural."
How long, I wonder, before they claim the trademark rights in the use
of this term for the marketing of groceries?
On the street, hot pink posters stapled to telephone poles inform
me that the Nancy Sinatras (a local lesbian band) are playing the
Cameron (a local pub) again on Thursday. Huge billboard adver-
tisements for Black Label® beer loom overhead. Populated by
nonchalant black-clad youth posing in smoky billiard halls, they seem
eerily to echo something of the local mien. In fact, this is exactly what
they do. Black Label® had been a "dormant brand" for many years.
It was precisely this lack of connotation-the mark's minimalist
economy-that made the brand a favorite among those associated
with the Queen Street counterculture in the late 1980s. Any beer that
wasn't associated with suburban barbecues, babes in bikinis, and
weekends with the buddies was difficult to find, and this one's black
label was cooly mnemonic of the anti-lifestyle of the area's artists,
actors, students, and cultural workers. Noticing the increase in sales,
the manufacturer located the neighborhood taverns doing the brisk
business and decided to explore its new market. Students "in plain
clothes" were sent as detectives to investigate the rites, ethos, and
symbols of this lifeworld; sufficient ethnography was accomplished to
model renewed advertising upon the signifying styles characteristic of
the subculture so discovered. The advertising campaign subsequently
won national awards, and was chronicled and celebrated as the
creative authorial work of corporate copyrighters. For years, local
residents were surrounded by commercial simulacra of their leisure
(but tourists were at least assured that they were in the right
neighborhood).
A teenager on the streetcar I board shrugs off a leather jacket
adorned with a stitch-on emblem-a cameo of the Colonel (you know
the one), his genteel Southern gentleman's face overlaid with skull
and crossbones. Food tampering, I wonder? No, too literal-maybe
a comment on the company's treatment of chickens. I ask her if she
knows why there is a skull and crossbones over the Kentucky Fried
Chicken® logo. Glancing quickly and curiously at her jacket she says,
"It's my boyfriend's, but I think you can buy them." "Do you know
who makes them?" I ask. She looks at me as if I had requested the
name of her narcotics source and murmurs something noncommittal.
I wave from the window to a few of my former students selling silk-
screened t-shirts. This week they are embossed with the cartoon
image of My Favorite Martian', the insignia of Mattel's Hot
4
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Wheels®, and reproductions of popular book jackets. Recently they
created t-shirts that featured the cover of anthropologist Emily
Martin's book, The Woman in the Body,5 which reproduces Picasso's
"Girl Before a Mirror," and the jacket of Foucault's Discipline and
Punish,6 which reproduces a gruesome medieval woodblock. These
were sold to local feminists, sadomasochists, and tourists seeking
souvenirs to recall their experience of the street's intertextual
sophistication. I'm somewhat bemused that these book covers are the
most immediately useful resources they derived from my Law and
Contemporary Social Theory course. At least in some eyes, I'm
uncomfortably aware, my status as a professor teaching intellectual
property at the country's most esteemed faculty of law demands a less
reflexive view of my students' entrepreneurial activities. I'm more
concerned that their inventories may at any time be seized without
notice by zealous monitors of those private properties that circulate
culturally in the public sphere, and that criminal charges may be laid
by state officials whose sense of the public interest seems shaped
primarily by profit-oriented actors. It is difficult merely to wink in the
students' direction.
A young girl I guess to have Salvadorean ancestry walks by carrying
a bottle of water trademarked "Clearly CanadianT." How much
easier it is to acquire membership in a national community through
the indicia of consumption than through the bureaucracy of im-
migration tribunals and refugee claims procedures. On the back of the
newspaper I'm carrying, a major brewery advertises one of its flagship
brands ("Canadian" beer). The slogan "I am... Canadian" surrounds
an image of a young white man struggling with his fly in what appears
to be a motel room. "Next time, I'll remember to bring underwear,"
the caption reads. The welfare state is slowly but surely dismantled
and ideologists of free trade sacrifice national traditions of care,
shared responsibility, and social commitment for the uncertain
benefits of foreign investment and competitive standing in a global
economy. A tawdry and exclusionary image of national belonging
circulates in the press, while others struggle to have the dimensions
of their suffering heard in parliaments. Market forces shape the
commerce of meanings that citizenship may acquire, ever proclaiming
the transparency of the nation-state and the simplicity of its claims
upon us.
In a grocery store window incongruously juxtaposed with more
fashionable retro facades, the Land'o'Lakes® Indian princess peeks
5. EMILY MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY (1987).
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out from amidst the clutter. Nearby, expensive art deco and fifties
collectibles are represented by dozens of gleaming chrome objects
displayed in the front window of the Red IndianM store. Such slick
nostalgia, marketed with an emblem from an era when "we" were
more "innocent" and less "politically correct," sits altogether too
smugly across the street from a crafts outlet owned by native peoples,
in which exquisite beadwork sits abandoned on dusty sheets of peg-
board. A few yards away, advertisements for Indian' jeans dominate
the walls of a bus shelter where a man of First Nations ancestry is
unconsciously sprawled, suffering the devastating cumulative effects
of solvent abuse in a hostile urban environment. More "Clearly
Canadian'," I wonder? A cheerful Disney film titled The Indian in
the Closet is advertised through marketing tie-ins promoted by
McDonalds®-children are promised their own free "Indian" with
every Happy Meal T . Both in the Magic Kingdom® and under The
Golden Arches®, native peoples are mere toys to fire fantasy.
Attempts by First Nations peoples to "come out of the closet" and
protest their stereotyping in commercial culture provide poignant
reminders of the political stakes in contemporary struggles over
commodified representations.
On my way into the subway, I pass the Twiggy restaurant and
reluctantly shift my attention to the intellectual property lecture ahead
of me. Already I have considered at least thirty-four legally protected
cultural texts, run into about a dozen potential intellectual property
infringements, and encountered a score of other intellectual properties
I didn't reflect upon. Other representations, no longer protected by
laws of trademark and copyright, are now part of the city's vibrant
public domain, while elements of the public domain are constantly
appropriated in the proprietary expressions of those whom the law
recognizes as authors. Intellectual property issues press upon me in
the commercial culture I share with my students, but eighteenth-
century philosophical frameworks are deemed the appropriate
academic vehicles with which to explore the dusty doctrines of
copyright. There are "cases to cover" and I must get through them all
on time.
My meanderings along Queen Street mirror and compress the
major themes of my work on intellectual property over the last
decade. These issues, concerns, and practices include: the constitutive
role of intellectual properties in commercial and popular culture; the
forms of cultural power the law affords holders of copyright,
trademark, and publicity rights; the significance of celebrity images in
alternative imaginations of gender; the commodification of citizenship
and the negotiation of national belonging on commercial terrain; the
appropriations, reappropriations and rumors that continually
6
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reactivate and reanimate commodity/signs7 to make them speak to
local needs; the colonial categorical cartographies that underlie our
legal regimes; and the postcolonial struggles of indigenous peoples to
eliminate commodified representations of their alterity. Consideration
of these themes has enabled me to delineate the parameters of what
I nominate "a critical cultural legal studies."
II. THE INTERPRETIVE LIFE OF THE LAW
The cultural dimensions of social life and the interpretive nature of
human experience have become issues of concern in legal scholarship
primarily in the last decade.8 The Yale Journal of Law & the
Humanities has been a significant venue for such work. As I have
suggested elsewhere, literature in this vein too rarely addresses the
legal status of the signifying vehicles with which meaning is made.9
Intellectual property laws, which create private property rights in
cultural forms, afford fertile fields of inquiry for considering the social
intersections of law, culture, and interpretive agency. The rights
bestowed by intellectual property regimes (copyright, trademark,
publicity rights, design patents, and associated merchandising rights in
particular) play a constitutive role in the creation of contemporary
cultures and in the social life of interpretive practice. As the Colonel
Sanders image, the nomination of Nancy Sinatra, and the ap-
propriation and reappropriation of the Picasso print indicate, the
imagery of commerce and the commodification of imagery provide a
rich semiotic source for expressive activity. In consumer cultures, most
pictures, texts, motifs, labels, logos, trade names, designs, tunes, and
even some colors and scents are governed, if not controlled, by
regimes of intellectual property. These legal frameworks enable the
reproduction and repetition of cultural forms as ever the same marks
of authorial proprietorship, while paradoxically prohibiting and
inviting their interpretive appropriation in the service of other
interests and alternative agendas. The law's recognition and protection
of some activities of meaning-making under the guise of authorship
7. A commodity/sign is a sign that is a commodity with an exchange value in its own right
as well as a signifier with a field of cultural connotation.
8. Those concerned with interpretive issues focus primarily upon the interpretation of legal
texts, with some lesser attention to the interpretation of legal facts. For an overview of the
development of the field of "law and interpretation," see Rosemary Coombe, Same As it Ever
Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation, 34 McGILL L.J. 603 (1989). For discussions
of the interpretation of legal facts, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1983); Kim
Lane Scheppele, Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE
42 (Robert Post ed., 1990); Kim Lane Scheppele, Manners of Imagining the Real, 14 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 995 (1995).
9. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1853 (1991).
19981 469
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(the corporate advertising copy) and its delegitimation of other
signifying practices as forms of piracy (the shoulder bag parody)
create particular boundaries for cultural agency. This dialectical
relationship between authorship and alterity is a significant, if
overlooked, dimension of contemporary cultural politics.
Scholars in literary theory, communications, film studies, and
political theory point to the social importance of media-circulated
cultural forms and their political significance in contemporary
consumer societies.10 As my saunter down Queen Street illustrates,
the texts protected by intellectual property laws signify-they are
cultural forms that assume local meanings in the lifeworlds of those
who incorporate them into their daily lives. Circulating widely in
contemporary public spheres, they provide symbolic resources for the
construction of identity and community, subaltern appropriations,
parodic interventions, and counterhegemonic narratives.
In philosophical, economic, moral, and utilitarian arguments, legal
scholars tend to address intellectual property laws purely abstractly,
as promoting reified rights in unremarkable, indistinguishable
intangible properties. For too long, legal scholars addressed intellec-
tual property protections in terms of incentives to produce abstract
goods, without considering what was "owned," or how rights of
possession were (or were not) exercised. There has been too little
consideration of the cultural nature of the actual forms that intellec-
tual property laws protect, the social and historical contexts in which
cultural proprietorship is (or is not) assumed, and the manner in
which these rights are (or are not) exercised and enforced to
intervene in everyday struggles over meaning. The political conse-
quences of expanding intellectual property rights in a democratic
society are only now receiving long-needed attention." Not insig-
10. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 32.
11. For discussions of the political economy of copyright, see RON BETIG, COPYRIGHTING
CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996). For protections of
intellectual property more generally, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS:
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); and Keith Aoki,
(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1297 (1996). For discussions of the importance of the public domain and legal
developments that threaten it, see Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners:
Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1993);
Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993); Doreen M. Koenig, Joe Camel and the First Amendment: The Dark
Side of Copyrighted and Trademark-Protected Icons, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 803 (1994); David
Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the
Post-Literate Millenium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1992); Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse
Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV.
429 (1994); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); and Michael Madow,
Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127
(1993). For discussions of the expressive dimensions of intellectual property usage and the First
Amendment implications thereof, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:
8
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nificantly, much of this new academic work is being carried out by
younger, female, and minority legal scholars sensitive to the workings
of power and the effects of subjection and subjugation that pervade
even the most facially "neutral" areas of legal doctrine. My own work
is very much part of this larger critical project; it is distinguished (as
works and signatures must be in market economies) from other recent
work in the same vein by an ethnographic sensibility, greater attention
to the workings of law in everyday life, local knowledges and local
practices-and by a greater cynicism with respect to the potential for
categories derived from Enlightenment traditions to adequately
address the issues raised by contemporary forms of cultural politics.
Moreover, I believe that controversies over intellectual properties
speak to larger debates in the humanities and social sciences about
cultural texts and subject-formations, identity and community,
hegemony and alterity, democracy and difference, imagery and
embodiment, nationality and narrativity.
Laws of intellectual property mediate a politics of contested
meaning that may be traced in the creation and appropriation of
symbolic forms and their unanticipated reappropriations in the
agendas of others. Intellectual property protections may disrupt
activities of meaning-making, but such activities may also disrupt the
positivity of legal meanings. The mass-reproduced, media-circulated
cultural form accrues social meaning in a multiplicity of sites, but
legally, the meaning of a text is produced exclusively at a mythic point
of origin. Thus, the Black Label® advertising campaign was, in legal
terms, corporately authored, even though the revitalized realm of
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Why Should We Be Paying
Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123
(1996); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as
Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1992, at 93; Wendy J. Gordon,
Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private
Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009 (1990); and Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright,
Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997). But see Neil Natanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996), for a more sanguine view.
For considerations of similar issues in digital environments, see Julie Cohen, A Right to Read
Anonymously, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social
Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin
Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and
Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say
Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237 (1997); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right
to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law
in Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587 (1997), Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright
Law for the Information Age, 75 OREGON L. REV. 19 (1996); and Pamela Samuelson & Jerome
Reichman, Intellectual Property Rights in Data: An Assault on the Worldwide Public Interest in
Research and Development, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997).
1998]
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connotation in which the brand became central was created by the
expressive work of consumers.
The law may freeze the play of signification by legitimating
authorship, deeming meaning to be value properly redounding to
those who "own" the signature or proper name, without regard to the
contributions or interests of those others in whose lives it figures. This
enables and legitimates practices of cultural authority that attempt to
contain the expression of difference (and difftrence) in the public
sphere. Emergent social differences are often expressed through the
medium of commodified texts-texts that are defined legally as
properties. Such differentiations in interpretive practice paradoxically
may be encouraged even as they are explicitly deterred by regimes of
intellectual property. These are propositions I develop and substanti-
ate in my forthcoming work, The Cultural Life of Intellectual
Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law. 2
With respect to the potential parameters of an interdisciplinary
project like a cultural studies of law, certain convictions have emerged
from and guided my research. There is little purchase, I am con-
vinced, in constructing an ideal bridge to join two autonomous realms
of "law" and "culture," insofar as this would reinforce the
metaphysics of modernity that enabled their emergence as discrete
and naturalized domains of social life.13 An exploration of the nexus
of law and culture will not be fruitful unless it can transcend and
transform its initial categories. A continuous mutual disruption-the
undoing of one term by the other-may be a more productive
figuration than the image of relationship or joinder.
My encounters along Queen Street reflect and refract the major
themes of my work. The lecture that followed this walk-at a time
when I half-heartedly acquiesced in merely covering and questioning
12. ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (forthcoming 1998).
13. Law and culture(s) emerge conceptually as autonomous realms of being in Enlighten-
ment and Romantic imaginaries; they share a parallel historical trajectory in ideologies that
legitimate and naturalize bourgeois class power and global European hegemonies. To ask how
it became possible to frame questions in these terms-under what conditions it became
conceivable to comprehend law as something that regulates culture or culture as something that
helps us to understand law-is to inquire into a history of mutual implication in European
modes of domination. Recognition of the Eurocentric, racist, and colonialist provenance of these
categories does, however, open up conceptual space for new avenues of inquiry. Whether this
interdisciplinary opportunity is deemed a cultural studies of law, a critical legal anthropology,
and/or a genre of cultural studies, matters less than a continuing rejection of reified concepts of
law and culture. I develop this point at more length in Rosemary J. Coombe, Contingent
Articulations: A Critical Cultural Studies of Law, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 21
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998). For discussions of the histories of the emergence
of law and culture as discrete and autonomous realms, see PETER FrIZPATRICK, MYTHOLOGIES
OF MODERN LAW (1992); and ROBERT YOUNG, COLONIAL DESIRE: HYBRIDITY IN THEORY,
CULTURE AND RACE (1995).
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the doctrine contained in appellate-level judicial decisions as a model
for legal pedagogy-does not figure as significantly. Although litigated
and reported cases are important, I believe that a critical cultural
studies of law should not put its primary interpretive emphasis on
these. Like other practitioners of cultural studies, my approach is
antipositivist. I do not presuppose that the social life of the law can
be explored simply in terms of its logos, positivities, or presences. It
must also be seen in terms of "counterfactuals,"' 4 the missing, the
hidden, the repressed, the silenced, the misrecognized, and the traces
of practices and persons underrepresented or unacknowledged in its
legitimations. To embody a sensitivity to the marginalized-the
absences and inaudibilities in contemporary cultural spheres-I have
avoided limiting my inquiries to reported cases or even to litigated
disputes. The law's impact may be felt where it is least evident and
where those affected may have few resources to recognize or pursue
their rights in institutional fora. This is certainly true in the field of
intellectual property, where the interpretive life of the law may be
found in rumors and myths about rights and obligations, local
conventions of textual appropriation, cease-and-desist letters, and
injunctions threatened and settled without hearings in disputes rarely
addressed at trial on their legal merits. To understand the power of
law in such circumstances requires a more robust theoretical
framework that more adequately addresses the law's cultural power.
Although my sensibility is an ethnographic one, an entrenched
skepticism toward both law and culture as reified fields of social life
animates my anthropological perspective upon issues of intellectual
property. In short, I suggest that exploring law culturally provides a
more focused and politicized emphasis upon meaning in those
disciplinary spaces that are preoccupied with questions of power.
Similarly, studying culture legally in fields like anthropology and
cultural studies will enable disciplines with tendencies toward
culturalism to have more specific and material theories of power.
Considered as a field of cultural politics, intellectual property has
provided an especially promising point of entry for exploring the
prospects for an interdisciplinarity that enmeshes perspectives drawn
from anthropology, cultural studies, and law and society scholarship.
These perspectives are informed by a decade of debates about the
concept of culture that emerged (for better or for worse) under the
rubric of postmodernism.
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III. AGAINST THE DISCIPLINE OF CULTURE(S)
Discussions about culture-its heuristic value and political
limitations as a term of analysis-reveal a pervasive unease. Mis-
givings about the heuristic value of studying culture(s) and the powers
legitimated by such reifications have generated new perspectives and
avenues of research in both the discipline of anthropology and the
interdisciplinary field of cultural studies. As anthropologists ac-
knowledged the orientalizing tendencies of a concept of culture that
delineated discrete cultures as formations to be studied in their own
terms (cultures with a lowercase "c"), they became increasingly
cognizant of the complex relations between power and meaning in
everyday life.15 Culture has been largely reconceptualized as ac-
tivities of expressive struggle rather than symbolic context, as
involving conflicted signifying practices rather than integrated systems
of meaning. Influenced by Gramsci-often mediated through
Raymond Williams-anthropologists over the past two decades have
become more comfortable with the idea of culture as both the
medium and the consequence of social differences, inequalities,
dominations, and exploitations-the form of their inscription and the
means of their collective and individual imbrication.
Similarly, in reaction to the Eurocentrism and elitism of the
humanities' privileging of "Culture" as a canon of discrete works of
European art and literature (which I will hereinafter designate culture
with an uppercase "C"), a critical cultural studies was forged. Cultural
studies is not "a tightly coherent, unified movement with a fixed
agenda, but a loosely coherent group of tendencies, issues, and
questions."16 Emerging from a widespread dissatisfaction with the
Eurocentric elitism characteristic of those fields of humanities that
traditionally took Culture as their object of inquiry, cultural studies
practitioners rejected the modernist insistence upon the integrity and
autonomy of the literary or artistic work and the value of studying
cultural artifacts as self-sufficient wholes. They connected texts to the
specific histories of their production, consumption, reception, and
circulation within socially differentiated fields. In accordance with
Williams's dictum that "culture is ordinary," British cultural studies
15. See, e.g., RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL
ANALYSIS (1989).
16. Id. at ix. A good history of cultural studies is provided in IOAN DAVIES, CULTURAL
STUDIES AND BEYOND: FRAGMENTS OF EMPIRE (1995). Summary overviews of cultural studies
abound; metatheories of the field's coverage and import are now almost as ubiquitous as
examples of the genre. Toby Miller provides an irreverent overview of the overviews and a
copious bibliography. See Toby Miller, Introducing Screening Cultural Studies, 7 CONTINUUM 11
(1994).
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centered upon everyday life-the structures and practices within and
through which societies construct and circulate meanings and
values. 7 Like contemporary ethnographers, practitioners of cultural
studies reject the modern focus upon the singularity and integrity of
authorial works. They study cultural forms not as timeless statements
of value but as "the real, the occasional speech of temporally and
historically situated human beings."' 8 They emphasize contingency
and particularity, affect and ambivalence, iteration and itinerance
rather than "the eternal and the abstract in language and ex-
perience."' 19 Again, we see a shift toward the cultural politics of
quotidian practice. Rejecting modernity's boundaries between culture
and everyday life as well as the related distinction between high
culture and popular culture, cultural studies attends to everyday
cultural practices as the locus both of domination and transformation.
In its connection of the social life of textuality with everyday
experience and its attention to the social centralizations and mar-
ginalizations realized through rhetorical deployments, this approach
shares many of the inclinations that shape postmodern anthropology.
These scholarly tendencies to write against culture have parallels in
the field of law and social inquiry. In the last decade, many law and
society scholars have turned away from positivist, formalist
(doctrinalist or structuralist), and institutionally centered accounts of
law to explore law as a more diffuse and pervasive force shaping
social consciousness and behavior. Although sociolegal studies has no
explicit agenda of writing against law, such tendencies are nascent, if
not fully realized, in a growing body of literature.20 As disillusion-
ment with instrumentalist, functionalist, and structuralist paradigms
have set in, concerns with law's legitimation functions-its cultural
role in constituting the social realities we recognize-were emphasized.
Constitutive theories of law recognize law's productive capacities, as
well as its prohibitions and sanctions, shifting attention to the
workings of law in ever more improbable settings. 2' Focusing less
17. See BRANTLINGER, supra note 14, at 37.
18. STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE 120 (1989).
19. Id. at 121.
20. Most scholars of law and society write against law as a body of self-sufficient doctrine,
or law as an autonomous set of institutions. They also reject the abstractions of structuralist
analyses of law or liberal legal discourse, even when such practices are allegedly critical, as they
are in Critical Legal Studies and critical race theory. These might be seen as propensities to
write "against law" in the sense that these scholars are writing against its dominant self-represen-
tations.
21. See, e.g., Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a Postliberal Society, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
89 (1993); see also ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A
CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW (1993); S. Lees, Lawyers' Work as Constitutive of Gender
Relations, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 124
(Christine Harrington & Maureen Cain eds., 1994). For a brief, introductory discussion of the
1998]
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exclusively upon formal institutions, law and society scholarship has
begun to look more closely at law in everyday life,22 in quotidian
practices of struggle, and in consciousness itself.23 A critical cultural
studies of law should be informed by all of these tendencies to write
"against culture." As Arjun Appadurai suggests:
The subject matter of cultural studies could roughly be taken as
the relationship between the word and the world. I understand
these two terms in their widest sense, so that word can encom-
pass all forms of textualized expression, and world can mean
anything from the "means of production" and the organization
of life-worlds to the globalized relations of cultural reproduc-
tion.'
Connecting texts to contexts, however, does not assume holistic
systems of meaning-that is, culture in the Romantic or modern
anthropological sense. Indeed, cultural studies eschews social
organicism, or the idea that the life of a nation may be found
embodied in its "works" of cultural expression:
[C]ultural processes are intimately connected with social
relations, especially with class relations and class formations, with
sexual divisions, with the racial structuring of social relations and
with age oppressions as a form of dependency. [C]ulture involves
power and helps to produce asymmetries in the abilities of
individuals and social groups to define and realize their
needs. [C]ulture is neither an autonomous nor an externaly
determined field, but a site of social differences and struggles.
To fully appreciate such sites, we need to adopt multiple and shifting
perspectives that consider multiple moments of a cultural form's social
life.26 These would include places in people's daily lives, in the realm
of public representations, the contexts and conditions of interpretive
constitutive perspective, see Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms
of Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21 (Austin Sarat & Thomas
R. Kearns eds., 1993).
22. See, for example, the essays collected in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 21. See
also Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers in Everyday Life: Mediation in Divorce Practice, 28 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 149 (1994).
23. For representative examples, see THE RHETORIC OF LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1994); Sally Engle Merry, Resistance and the Cultural Power of Law, 29 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 11 (1995); Michael Musheno, Legal Consciousness on the Margins of Society: Struggles
against Stigmatization in the AIDS Crisis, 2 IDENTITIES 101 (1995); Austin Sarat, "... The Law
Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 343 (1990); Susan Silbey & Patricia Ewick, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance:
An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992).
24. Arjun Appadurai, Global Ethnoscapes, in RECAPTURING ANTHROPOLOGY 191, 196
(Richard Fox ed., 1991); see also ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
25. Richard Johnson, What is Cultural Studies Anyway?, 16 Soc. TEXT 38, 39 (1987).
26. See id.
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reception, the influence and contestations of those readings in private
lives and social lifeworlds, the authorization, legitimation, denial, or
injunction of those interpretations in institutional fora, and the
potential transformation of such readings in the production of new
cultural forms.
Such multidirectional social circuits of textuality are all too rarely
addressed. More often than not, scholars focus on one or two
movements in this journey as if the other moments in some way
followed. As Richard Johnson asserted in an influential overview of
cultural studies, we cannot know how a text will be read simply from
the conditions of its production, any more than we can know which
readings of a text will assume salience within people's everyday
lives.27 Scrutinizing texts in terms of their formal qualities tells us
nothing about their conditions of production or consumption, the
basis of their authority, nor their likely interaction with existing
ensembles of cultural meanings in socially specific experiences. These
ensembles, "reservoirs of discourses and meanings, are in turn raw
material for fresh cultural production. They are indeed among the
specifically cultural conditions of production."2
Cultural studies theorists attend too little, however, to the political
economies that enable cultural forms to circulate-economies with
legal infrastructures. The legal dimensions of cultural production,
circulation, and reception have been shamefully neglected.29 There
27. See id.
28. Id. at 47.
29. Some recent works addressing intellectual property are welcome exceptions. See BOYLE,
supra note 11. James Boyle provides a characteristically elegant structuralist analysis of the
liberal legal discourses that legitimate new forms of property in the information age under the
rubric of authorship in Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the
Information Society. Id. The collapsing of cultural questions into issues of information cir-
culation, however, obscures the worlds of human significance in which cultural forms have social
consequence. Moreover, by accepting the entertainment industry's position that copyright is a
means of managing and capitalizing upon information in a postindustrial world, the historically
fundamental limitation upon copyright-the restriction of protection to prohibitions upon the
reproduction of expressive works-is foregone. In my view, this limitation is simply too
central-both to copyright's ideology, and to any principled boundary to the copyright
monopoly-to be ignored, glossed over, or effaced. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see
Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary Borders in a Less Than
Brave New World, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1357 (1996); Rosemary J. Coombe, Left Out on the
Information Highway, 75 OR. L. REV. 237 (1996). Thomas Streeter shows the pervasive
resurgence of the figure of the author in the allocation of property and the attribution of
revenue in the wake of new communications technologies. See THOMAS STREETER, SELLING
THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES (1996). Celia Lury provides a superb historical sociology of the development of various
forms of intellectual property, their role in changing forms of social reproduction and in
constituting modes of cultural authority. See CULTURAL RIGHTS: TECHNOLOGY, LEGALITY AND
PERSONALITY (1993). Lury accords little specificity to the legal frameworks she sees as having
such social and cultural significance, however, and does not address the deployment and
interpretation of law. See also the historical studies reviewed in Rosemary J. Coombe, Contesting
Paternity: Histories of Authorship, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397 (1994).
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has been too great a tendency in cultural studies either to
metaphorize law (as in the psychoanalytic Law of the Father),3 ° or
to fetishize it, according to it a unity and canonical existence that
would be rejected were it to be applied to other textual forms. Only
at cultural studies conferences, for example, is it possible to hear
scholars authoritatively proclaim that "the law says," as if the law
spoke in a singular, unambiguous voice. It is precisely the formalist
emphasis upon texts-even legal ones-as isolated works, that a
cultural studies of law should avoid. Rather than stress isolated
decisions, statutes, or treatises, we need to attend to the social life of
law's textuality and the legal life of cultural forms as it is expressed
in the specific practices of socially situated subjects.31
The proliferation of textuality, is, of course, yet another of the
processes to which the vexed term postmodernity refers. It "indicates
something of the size and the scale of the new global and local social
relations and identities set up between individuals, groups, and
populations as they interact with and are formed by the multiplicity
of texts and representations which are a constitutive part of contem-
porary reality and experience."32 This textually-saturated, hyper-
These scholars provide important historical overviews of the evolution of legal structures to
which my own work is greatly indebted. None, however, shares either the emergent emphasis
in cultural studies upon the everyday life of textuality or recognition of the imbrication of
textuality in struggles over identity and community. Ironically, as Toby Miller reminds us, the
British school of cultural studies was initially focused upon legal questions, and the Birmingham
school was funded with the settlement of a legal struggle involving issues of literature and
censorship. Commenting upon Richard Hoggart, Miller remarks:
The oldest of the three men conventionally catalogued as the founding parents of cultural
studies, and the first director of the Birmingham Centre, [Hoggart] is oft-listed alongside
Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, but rarely made the subject of equivalent exegetical
projections. It is worth remarking that, in Hoggart's phrase, cultural studies always had a
significant engagement with the bureaucratic public sphere (also known as the law).
Hoggart it was who gave the crucial testimony at the Lady Chatterley trial. Penguin Books
it was that subsequently made the endowment-in-gratitude which was used to establish the
Centre. And Hoggart it was that served on the United Kingdom's Pilkington Committee
on Broadcasting.
Toby Miller, Culture with Power: The Present Moment in Cultural Policy Studies, 22 SOUTHEAST
ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 264, 270 (1994) (citations omitted). For a more direct examination of the
intersection of law and cultural studies, see STEVE REDHEAD, UNPOPULAR CULTURE: THE
BIRTH OF LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (1995). A recent anthology, see LEGAL STUDIES AS
CULTURAL STUDIES (J. Leonard ed., 1995), is more reflective of poststructuralist and
deconstructivist theory in legal studies than it is of any engagement with the field of cultural
studies.
30. See GILLIAN ROSE, DIALECTICS OF NIHILISM (1984). For a critical exploration, see Alan
Pottage, The Law of the Father, in POLMCS, POSTMODERNITY, AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES:
THE LEGALITY OF THE CONTINGENT 147 (Costas Douzinas et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter
LEGALITY OF THE CONTINGENT].
31. For a more elaborate outline of the parameters of such a perspective, see Rosemary J.
Coombe, Room for Manoeuver: Towards a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 69 (1989).
32. ANGELA MCROBBIE, POSTMODERNISM AND POPULAR CULTURE 26 (1994); see also
George Marcus, Past, Present and Emergent Identities: Requirements for Ethnographies of Late
Twentieth-Century Modernity Worldwide, in MODERNITY AND IDENTITY 309 (Scott Lash &
16
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol10/iss2/11
Coombe
significant world needs to be reintegrated with the regimes of law and
regulation that govern and shape it if we are to understand the
relationship between the word and the world as a dialectical space of
governance and praxis as well as one of authorship and readership.
Intellectual property protections are central cultural conditions of
production, circulation, and reception-providing incentives to
produce and disseminate texts, and regulating modes of circulation for
cultural forms, while enabling, recognizing, and enjoining alternative
forms of reception and interpretation. An ethnographic approach to
intellectual properties, I suggest, provokes new insights into the
struggles over meaning and power that define many ongoing political
dramas of possession and dispossession in so-called postindustrial
contexts where a proliferation of textuality and mass-reproduced
imagery constitutes new realities.
IV. LAW'S CULTURAL POWER
Legal fora are obviously significant sites for practices in which
hegemony is constructed and contested-providing institutional
venues for struggles to establish and legitimate authoritative
meanings. The adoption of legal strategies may give meanings the
force of material enforcement. Law is constitutive of social realities,
generating positivities as well as prohibitions, legitimations, and
oppositions to the subjects and objects it recognizes. The revitalization
of legal anthropology has been especially significant in contributing
to our theoretical understandings of power, hegemony, and resis-
tance.33 Legal discourses, we now understand, provide resources for
resistance as well as regulation, possibility as well as prohibition,
subversion as well as sanction. If law is central to hegemonic
processes, it is also a key resource in counterhegemonic struggles.
When it shapes the realities we recognize, it is not surprising that its
spaces should be seized by those who would have other versions of
social relations ratified and other cultural meanings mandated.
Law, then, is culturally explored "as a discourse, process, practice,
and system of domination and resistance., 34 Historically structured
and locally interpreted, law provides means and fora both for
legitimating and contesting dominant meanings and the social
hierarchies they support. Hegemony is an ongoing articulatory
Jonathan Friedman eds., 1992); George Marcus & Fred Myers, The Traffic in Art and Culture:
An Introduction, in THE TRAFFIC IN CULTURE: REFIGURING ART AND ANTHROPOLOGY 1
(George Marcus & Fred Myers eds., 1995).
33. See John Comaroff, Foreword to CONTESTED STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY AND RESIS-
TANCE ix, ix-xii (Susan Hirsch & Mindie Lazarus-Black eds., 1994) [hereinafter CONTESTED
STATES].
34. Susan Hirsch & Mindie Lazarus-Black, Introduction to CONTESTED STATES, id. at 1, 1-2.
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practice that is performatively enacted in juridical spaces, where, as
Susan Hirsch and Mindie Lazarus-Black put it, "hegemonic and
oppositional strategies both constitute and reconfigure each other."35
The law creates spaces in which hegemonic struggles are engaged over
signs and symbols, the connotations of which are always ever at risk.
Legal strategies and legal institutions may lend authority to certain
interpretations while denying status to others. The multiple con-
notations contextually created by my student's t-shirts, however
significant, bear no weight when up against the crushing pressures of
private interests and public power. Such reactivated meanings,
however, are only possible given the contingent fixities enabled by the
law's proprietary guarantees. Had intellectual property laws not
protected such texts in the first instance, they would not have
acquired the posterity that makes them such ideal candidates for
parodic redeployment.
Relations between legal owners and others-legally authorized
texts, their alterations, and ensuing altercations-provide a social
nexus for illustrating these propositions. Differences within the social
fabric are expressed with commodified texts, and differences in
meaning are inadvertently encouraged and overtly contained by
regimes of intellectual property. Differences between those who
disseminate commodity/signs and those who consume them animate
the legal regulation of cultural forms; such cultural forms simulta-
neously become media for expressing alterity while they function as
expressions of authorial distinction.
Practices of authorial power and appropriation, authorized
meanings and alternative renderings, and owners' interests and others'
needs cannot, however, be addressed simply in terms of dichotomies
like domination and resistance. Romantic celebrations of insurrec-
tionary alterity-long popular in cultural studies-cannot capture the
dangerous nuances of cultural appropriation in circumstances in which
the very resources with which people express difference are the
properties of others. Acts of transgression, though multiply motivated,
are also shaped by the juridical fields of power in which they
intervene.
Legal regimes shape the social meanings assumed by signifying
properties in public spheres. Such meanings are socially produced in
fields characterized by inequalities of discursive and material
resources, symbolic capital, and access to channels of communication.
The commodification of cultural forms creates new relations of power
in contemporary cultural politics-arenas for connotative struggle or
35. Id. at 9.
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"contested culture," as Jane Gaines so nicely put it in the title of her
pathbreaking book.36 If we recognize cultural signifiers as multivocal
sites of conflict, which bear the traces of social struggles and
historically inscribed differences, then laws that prohibit the cir-
culation of these forms-their ironic reproductions and parodic
recodings-necessarily intervene in processes of hegemonic ar-
ticulation. Moreover, if signifying forms have meaning only within
specific histories and political practices, the investigation of power and
meaning in legal studies must not be permitted to devolve into an
"abstract deconstruction of metaphysics but [must involve] a
resolutely historical inquiry into the concreteness of the ordinary,"37
a "return to the terrain of lived experience."38 Like other cultural
studies, legal studies might attend to "the important but often
unnoticed dynamics of everyday life: the sounds in the kitchen, the
noises in the home, and the signs and styles on the street."39 I take
t-shirts and bumper-stickers, billboards, newspaper debates, product
labels, neon signs, lapel buttons, and cartoon figures as "signs and
styles on the street" that figure in everyday expressive activity and in
the articulation of that space we define as the social.
Laws protecting intellectual properties influence (although they do
not determine) the ways in which cultural signs are re/appropriated by
those who assert difference in the spaces of similarity-imitating and
mimicking the signs of authority to express relations of alterity.
Intellectual property law does not function simply in a rule-like
fashion, nor is it merely a regime of rights and obligations. Although
it is constructed through a rhetoric of rights, law is simultaneously a
generative condition and a prohibitive boundary for hegemonic
articulations and subaltern practices of appropriation.
Deciphering struggles over signification, law is at work shaping
social worlds of meaning not only when it is institutionally en-
countered, but also when it is consciously and unconsciously ap-
prehended. Hegemonic power is operative when threats of legal
action are made as well as when they are actually acted upon.
People's imagination of what "the law says" may be a shaping force
in those expressive activities that potentially violate it and in those
practices that might be considered protected acts of speech,
constitutionally defined. People's anticipations of law (however
reasonable, ill-informed, mythical, or even paranoid) may actually
shape law and the property rights it protects. This is especially the
36. JANE GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW (1990).
37. BRANTLINGER, supra note 14, at 66.
38. MCROBBIE, supra note 32, at 40.
39. Id. at 41.
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case in areas like trademark, which are premised upon legal fictions
of public meaning and consumer confusion. 40 The law is a palpable
presence when people create their own alternative standards and
sanctions governing the use of cultural forms-for example, in the
moral economies that emerge to regulate the use of images like those
of Kirk and Spock in fanzine subcultures shared by middle-class
women alienated from mainstream media representations.
41
The law's ideological effects are also realized when subaltern
peoples mimic the modes of communication effected by the com-
modity form-when national borders and boundaries of belonging are
negotiated through the deployment of the trademark and the form of
its authority by lesbian activists, ethnic minorities, and indigenous
peoples. 42 The law's hegemonic power is also felt when rumors
circulate about the origins of corporate trademarks. The demonic
rumors that attach to some consumer goods reveal both the law's
power to regulate the circulation of signs of corporate origins and its
relative incapacity to do so when this power is confronted with covert
social contestations. 43 When an inner city vendor sells (obviously
40. This theme is developed in COOMBE, supra note 12, at 41-87.
41. Celebrity names and likenesses protected by laws of publicity and privacy, for example,
provide signifying resources for the production of alternative gender identities. Judy Garland,
Dolly Parton, James Dean, Nancy Sinatra, Luke Skywalker, and Kirk and Spock are only some
of the figures in which libidinal energies are invested and around which identifications emerge
and new social identities congregate in relations of community. These are practices that deploy
media forms in cultural self-fashionings both engendered and endangered by the law. As
intellectual property laws operate to protect the exchange value of media-circulated cultural
forms, subcultural practices are themselves both enabled and constrained by legal regimes of
commodification. People's relationships to these signifiers are shaped by the knowledge that
these signs are both socially shared and individually owned. Those with specific attachments to
a particular star's image or fictional character often develop their own moral economies of
ownership, proprieties of possession, and ethics of use in the shadow of the law, developing
complex attitudes toward the exclusive rights legally held by others. See COOMBE, supra note
12, at 88-129; Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity Rights and Political Aspiration: Mass Culture,
Gender Identity, and Democracy, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1221 (1992); see also Tushnet, supra
note 11, and sources cited therein (for further examples of emerging ethics of textual
appropriation in other fan communities).
42. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Embodied Trademarks: Mimesis and Alterity on American
Commercial Frontiers, 11 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 202 (1996), for an historical discussion
of American Indian representations in trademark usage and a consideration of contemporary
protests against stereotypical images in commerce.
43. The mass-mediated nature of corporate power that is signified through the trademark
is simultaneously recognized and resisted in the bizarre rumors that people spread about the
meaning and origins of corporate brandnames, logos, package designs, and advertising
campaigns. Exploring prominent North American rumors in the 1980s, I consider these as
commentaries upon the fetishism of the legally constituted commodity/sign-the meaning of
postmodernity and its marginalizations emerging in the fantastic fabulations through which
marketing signs are reenchanted-in contexts where processes of production are invisible and
the signs of consumption ubiquitous. Rumors, I suggest, mimic the modes of circulation through
which trademarks make their way into our daily lives, simultaneously adopting and challenging
forms of corporate authorship and their legitimation in cultures of commerce. See Rosemary J.
Coombe, The Demonic Place of the "Not-There": Trademark Rumors in the Imaginary Culture
of Postindustriality, in CULTURE, POWER, PLACE: EXPLORATIONS IN CRITCAL ANTHROPOLOGY
249 (Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson eds., 1997).
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unlicensed) Black Bart (Simpson) t-shirts, the law is at work, as it is
when rumors circulate that a twelve-year-old boy has been arrested
for selling them.
A critical cultural legal studies demands more, then, than an
abstract "constitutivism," discursively modeled. It requires con-
sideration of concrete fields of struggle and their legal containment,
the legal constitution and recognition of symbolic struggle, and the
law's capacity to fix meaning while denying this as an operation of
power. It compels a perspective sensitive both to everyday practices
of worldmaking and to their institutional acknowledgment in juridical
spaces where material relations between meaning and power are
forged. Critical cultural legal studies recognizes culture as sig-
nification, but also addresses the materiality of signification by
recognizing the symbolic power of law and law's power over sig-
nification. This material struggle over signification is at once concrete
and textual as it takes place in the daily lives of contemporary
subjects.
Law is an authoritative means and medium of a cultural politics-in
which distinction and difference are constructed and contested-that
actively articulates that which we define as the "social." Recognizing
that the social world must be represented, performatively expressed,
and institutionally inscribed, we can avoid a metaphysics of political
presence that presupposes a realm of self-evidently political practices.
Drawing upon poststructuralist, deconstructivist, and psychoanalytic
insights,' I reject any vision of a social world in which differences
preexist the law, and law is called upon merely to resolve and
legitimate social claims generated elsewhere. Instead, I suggest we see
law as providing many, if not most, of the very signifying forms that
constitute socially salient distinctions, adjudicating their meanings and
shaping the very practices through which such meanings are disrupted.
Rather than assert the positivity of any social identity, we might see
identities as merely temporary, anxious, and uncertain resting points
in quests for recognition, legitimation, and identification.
44. For theoretical underpinnings for this approach, see AREH BOTWINICK, POSTMODERNISM
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1993); JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER (1997);
LEGALITY OF THE CONTINGENT, supra note 30; THE MAKING OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES
(Ernesto Laclau ed., 1994); MIAMI THEORY COLLECTIVE, COMMUNITY AT LOOSE ENDS (1991);
David Carroll, Community After Devastation: Culture, Politics and the "Public Space," in
POLITICS, THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 159 (Mark Poster ed., 1993); Ernesto
Laclau, Power and Representation, in POLITICS, THEORY, AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 277
(Mark Poster ed., 1993); and David Scott, A Note on the Demand of Criticism, 8 PUBLIC
CULTURE 41 (1995). On the importance of Jean-Luc Nancy's work in this context, see JEAN-LUC
NANCY, THE INOPERATIVE COMMUNITY (1991); RETREATING THE POLITICAL: PHILLIPPE
LACOUE-LABARTHE AND JEAN-LUC NANCY (Simon Sparks ed., 1997); and THE SENSE OF
PHILOSOPHY: ON JEAN-LUC NANCY (David Sheppard et al. eds., 1997).
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The actual engagement of the political involves historical moments
in which particular cultural forms become meaningful for particular
agents. Situations of subordination are transformed into spaces for
articulation through identifications with specific signifiers that hold
promise for new forms of political recognition. Because meanings
expressed through systems of signification are, by definition, per-
petually unstable, they are always capable of being deployed against
the grain. The ambiguities and traces of cultural forms may be seized
upon by those who may well repeat, imitate, and appropriate
elements of a dominant cultural order while critically marking
differences in social experience. The signifying forms around which
political action mobilizes and with which social rearticulations are
accomplished may be attractive and compelling precisely because of
the qualities of the powers legally bestowed upon them.45 Law is not
simply an institutional forum or legitimating discourse to which social
groups turn to have preexisting differences recognized; more crucially,
law is a central locus for the control and dissemination of those
signifying forms with which identities and difference are made and
remade.
Considerations of identity and its construction increasingly
preoccupy anthropologists and focus work in cultural studies and
sociolegal inquiry." Individual and collective identities are actively
45. The forms of signifying power that law enables may provoke or invite particular forms
of resistance and particular forms of alternative inscription. Such appropriations are aw[e]fully
appropriate to the forms of legally regulated signification to which they might be seen as forms
of response. The public propensity to remark upon dominant forms of signifying power is first
explored in a consideration of "official marks"-signs held by public authorities in the name of
the public interest. These are often key symbols in national and international cultural lexicons
with which subaltern groups seek affirmative association. Examining instances involving a gay
rights group in the United States, and Sikhs in Canada, I argue that the arbitrary exercise of
power to control the circulation of a sign, or the failure to exercise such a discretionary power,
may have significant political repercussions for the cultural identities of minority groups. There
are both real possibilities and real limitations on political activism posed by practices of
appropriation that recode these forms and by the legal regimes of trademark that govern them.
The use and abuse of powers to control such signs may both constitute or reverse perceptions
of social devaluation or stigma, articulate alternative narratives of national understanding, and
challenge exclusionary imaginaries of citizenship. When "Lesbians Fly Air Canada," and a "Gay
Olympics" are not prohibited, and Sikh Mounties are seen as representative Canadians (to take
a few examples), legal action and inaction will be central to such reinscriptions in the public
sphere. See COOMBE, supra note 12, at 130-65. An early and abbreviated version of the ar-
gument appears in Rosemary J. Coombe, Tactics of Appropriation and the Politics of Recognition
in Late Modern Democracies, 21 POL. THEORY 411 (1993).
46. The intellectual history behind this agenda is complex; it involves an analysis of issues
of consciousness, ideology, interpellation, subject-formation, and psychoanalysis engaging the
theoretical work of Marx, Althusser, Gramsci, Foucault, and Lacan. For representative and
influential works that embody such considerations, see POLIcS AND RIGHTS (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995); QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY (Stuart Hall and Paul
duGay eds., 1996); PAUL SMITH, DISCERNING THE SUBJECT (1988); and R. Sullivan, Marxism
and the "Subject of Anthropology," in MODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY 243 (M. Manganaro ed.,
1990).
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created by human beings through the social forms through which they
become conscious and sustain themselves as subjects in communities
of similarity. It is now widely acknowledged that law interacts with
other forms of discourse and sources of cultural meaning to construct
and to contest identities, communities, and authorities.47 An em-
phasis upon identity is congruent with the contemporary
anthropological uneasiness with the reification of culture and the
conviction that we need to understand culture as a description of
particular processes. Indeed, one anthropologist has gone so far as to
redefine culture as the act of identity construction: "Cultures are the
way specific social groups, acting under specific historical and material
conditions, have 'made themselves. ' '4 8 Identity is a trope that
enables us to consider the practices through which senses of self and
community are practically expressed and projected through the
medium of signifying texts.
Practitioners of cultural studies continually assert that media forms
provide the cultural vehicles through which new social meanings are
forged and stress their constitutive role in the creation of identity.
Cultural studies has devoted great energies in the study of subcul-
tures: media and genres of representation consumed, appropriated,
resisted, and recoded by groups on the margins of society. Those
representations protected by intellectual property (advertising, lyrics,
brandnames, corporate logos, slogans, indicia of government, and
celebrity images, for example) are prevalent and promising cultural
forms with which to consider cultural authority, subcultural for-
mations, and hegemonic struggles. The most vibrant, compelling, and
ubiquitous of cultural signifiers-those around which marginal groups
tend to mobilize-are often the properties of corporate others.
Indeed, it can be argued plausibly that the protections intellectual
property law affords (and the promise of revenue that legal protec-
tions offer) induce actors to invest in the widespread dissemination of
cultural forms. Media may become "mass" primarily by becoming
juridical, but culture becomes "popular" to the extent that these forms
are animated by the interpretive practices of others.
If the life of the law is experience, then the pervasive textuality of
experience in the late twentieth century needs to be understood
legally, and the local animation of the law should be addressed
experientially, in terms of the way law manages meaning, shapes
47. See Jane Collier et al., Sanctioned Identities: Legal Constructions of Modern Personhood,
2 IDENTITIES 1 (1995); Rosemary J. Coombe, Contesting the Self. Negotiating Subjectivities in
Nineteenth-Century Ontario Defamation Trials, 11 STUD. L., POL., & SOC'Y 3 (1991).
48. Terence Turner, Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What is Anthropology That
Multiculturalism Should Be Mindful of It?, 8 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 411, 427 (1993).
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relations of cultural authority and contestation, provokes a politics of
property, propriety, and appropriation, and provides forms and fora
for articulations of identity and difference. Jolted by espresso,
awakened by life on the street, and alert to the properties of contem-
porary cultural life, a critical cultural studies of law comes into view.
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